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I N T R O D U C T I O N  
With this special issue of Law and Philosophy, we honor the memory 
of Conrad D. Johnson, who died suddenly and unexpectedly, in 
the prime of his philosophical career. From the time he was 
a graduate student in the late 1960s until his death in 1992, 
Johnson thought with penetration and focus about the inter- 
relations between law and morality. Perhaps no one did more 
during this period to illustrate, as he put it, "the ways in which 
moral reasoning has benefited, and might be made more con- 
sciously to benefit, from ideas that are at root essentially legal in 
character" 
Struck, in his first year of graduate school, by Hart's remark 
that Hare's moral theory represented "an excessively Protestant 
approach," Johnson became convinced that much contemporary 
ethical philosophy had failed to appreciate the importance of  
custom, practice, and, especially, law to an understanding of 
morality. Even rule-utilitarian theories (as advanced by his teacher 
Richard Brandt), gave no intrinsic right-making weight to estab- 
lished practice and institutional process. According to "ideal" rule 
utilitarianism, right and wrong depend on the requirements of rules, 
the general teaching of which would have the best consequences. 
Johnson came to the view that while the consequences of a rule 
or practice (compared to those of alternative possible rules) are 
relevant to whether it should be followed, they are not determi- 
native. Moral rules are collective strategies for achieving beneficial 
consequences, not the least of which is mutual trust. And this 
requires giving weight to established common practice in moral 
reasoning. Accordingly, he concluded, right and wrong (in a given 
social context) are determined by established rules, so long as their 
consequences are better than what could be achieved by trying 
to promote the good individually. 
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On this view, moral truths are much closer to institutional truths 
than philosophers have been inclined to suppose in recent decades. 
There is still an important distinction between a society's mores 
(its institutionalized moral convictions) and morality (what is actually 
right or wrong for people in that social order), since established 
practices may have worse consequences than individuals can 
achieve non-collectively. Still, the consequentialist rationale only 
provides a threshold. So long as it is met, morality depends on 
actual practice. 
Johnson argued that the right way to understand morality's 
relation to social mores, on the one hand, and its rationale, on 
the other, is to see it on the model of  law. His Moral Legislation 
defends the analogy along with the normative theory he bases 
on it. Like law, morality includes different institutional functions. 
When  law-makers contemplate the task of  legislation, they look 
to consequentialist rationale and need give no intrinsic weight to 
currently governing law. In adjudication, however, a .judge is not 
permitted to proceed in this way. She must give weight to the estab- 
lished law, even if she thinks that other statutes might be more 
beneficial. Morality, too, admits o f  these distinctions, Johnson 
argued. Although we lack anything like a formal moral legisla- 
ture, something deserving to be call moral legislation nonetheless 
occurs - by salient example, persuasive argument, and so on. But 
only rarely are we in a position to legislate. As agents, we outstrip 
our authority if we attempt either to achieve beneficial conse- 
quences unilaterally, or to follow rules the general following of  
which would be most beneficial. Here morality gives weight to 
precedent. 
Conrad Johnson gave us the most systematic study and defense 
we have of  the analogy between morality and law. This volume 
collects essays from colleagues (and one former teacher) who 
admired and benefited from his work and who knew him as a 
person of  extraordinary integrity, generosity, and modesty. Conrad 
had a purity of  interest in ideas, and in other people, that enriched 
and gladdened the lives of  all who knew him. Moral and legal 
philosophy is in his (steadily appreciating) debt. 
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Finally, I must sadly note as well the passing of  one of  our con- 
tributors, Gregory Kavka. I believe his memorial essay for Conrad 
to be the last article Greg completed. 
Stephen Darwall, 
University of  Michigan, 
U.S.A. 
